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POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
CAPITAL SENTENCING -AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
In a recent decision, State v. Sonnier,' Justice Dennis
acknowledged that his approach to unsupported jury findings of ag-
gravating circumstances has failed to gain majority support. Justice
Dennis earlier had expressed the view that if one of the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury was unsupported by the evidence a
remand was necessary because the supreme court could not discern
whether the jurors would have unanimously recommended death
had they known (or had one of them known) that one of the ag-
gravating circumstances was unsupported.' Rather than following
this approach, the Louisiana Supreme Court has, in a series of cases,
decided that it need only determine whether at least one of the ag-
gravating circumstances found by the jury is supported by the evi-
dence.'
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit has adopted an approach somewhat similar to that espoused by
Justice Dennis. In Stephens v. Zant,' the appellate court set aside a
death sentence because one of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances relied on by the jury was unconstitutional. The Loui-
siana Supreme Court, in State v. Monroe,5 rather straight-forwardly
rejected the argument that Stephens dictated a remand if the
evidence was insufficient to support one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances. Chief Justice Dixon, the author of Monroe, did not
endeavor to distinguish Stephens, but instead rejected the approach.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court is not bound by the federal
appellate court's views, the lower federal courts are. In the exercise
of their habeas corpus jurisdiction, these lower courts undoubtedly
will be required to confront the potential conflict.
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981).
2. See State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d 300, 315-17 (La. 1979) (Denils, J., dissenting).
3. See State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1981); State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d
300 (La. 1979).
4. 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980); petition for cert. filed July 16, 1981.
5. 397 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1981).
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CAPITAL SENTENCING -JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE
EFFECT OF A NON-UNANIMOUS VERDICT
In State v. Williams,' the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed
the role of jury instructions in capital cases. The jury in Williams
deliberated for three hours; the foreman felt that the jury might not
be able to reach a unanimous verdict. Despite the foreman's request
that they be told whether their verdict "had to be unanimous,"' the
trial judge refused to advise the jury of the effect of their inability
to reach unanimity. The supreme court, on rehearing, remanded the
case, ordering a new penalty hearing.
Justice Dennis, author of the plurality opinion on rehearing,
phrased the issue in terms of "whether the jurors in a capital
sentence hearing must be informed by the trial judge that the defen-
dant will be sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of proba-
tion, parole or suspension of sentence, if they are unable to be
unanimous on a recommendation."8 Justice Dennis reasoned that the
failure to instruct the jury left them "free to speculate"9 as to the
result of their inability to agree, thus creating a substantial risk of
arbitrariness.
The approach of the plurality on rehearing is broader than re-
quired by the facts. The plurality on rehearing is significantly silent
on the critical issue addressed by Justice Lemmon's concurring opin-
ion. In his concurrence, Justice Lemmon construed the legislative
unanimity requirement as a means of insuring the state's right to
have the jury make a "substantial effort"'0 to reach unanimity. To
require a pre-deliberation instruction on the result of non-unanimity
would have the effect of informing the jury that twelve jurors must
vote to render a death sentence, while only one juror's vote is re-
quired to impose a life sentence. Justice Lemmon reasoned that
after the jury has deliberated for a significant perio4 and appears
deadlocked, the state's legislative right to have the jury strive to
seek unanimity must be subordinated to the defendant's right to
prevent an otherwise dissenting juror from acquiescing in the death
penalty recommendation solely for the purpose of reaching unanimity.
If the jury appears to be deadlocked disclosure becomes critical as a
means of minimizing the risk of arbitrary action.
Whether the jurors' request will be deemed critical remains an
unanswered question. After a significant period of deliberation has
6. 392 So. 2d 619 (La. 1980).
7. lI at 624.
8. ld at 634.
9. Id
10. Id at 640.
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revealed a possible deadlock (or at least some difficulty in reaching
unanimity), defense counsel will undoubtedly request the instruction
on the effect of non-unanimity (or renew his earlier request). At that
point, the writer submits that the jury should be given the instruc-
tion. The same concerns expressed by the four members of the court
who joined in the remand" would seem to apply without regard to
whether the jury or the defendant makes the request-or whether a
request is made at all. The issue seems to be whether the jury has
apparently made a substantial effort to reach unanimity and is ap-
parently unable to do so. At such point, the danger that a juror may
acquiesce in a death recommendation solely for the purpose of reach-
ing a verdict becomes a real possibility.
REINSTATEMENT OF APPEAL AFTER DISMISSAL DUE TO ERRONEOUS
INFORMATION CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S DEATH
In State v. Morris,2 the supreme court concluded that when the
defendant dies during the pendency of his appeal the conviction
should be set aside and the charges dismissed. The court reasoned
that whereas the state has no further interest in the finality of the
conviction, the defendant's family has an interest in the conviction
being set aside to preserve the defendant's memory. Although the
author disagrees with this rationale (particularly when a fine has
been imposed), the matter seems settled in Louisiana.
When the case of State v. McClow'3 first appeared on the
supreme court appellate docket, the attorney general informed the
court that the defendant was dead. Following Morris, the court
vacated McClow's conviction and ordered the charges dismissed.
However, the defendant was not dead. When he discovered that his
case had been ordered dismissed, the defendant filed an application
for a writ of habeas corpus. The application was denied by the trial
court and the supreme court affirmed, merely ordering that Mc-
Clow's appeal be reinstated for later consideration on the merits.
The supreme court wisely concluded that a dismissal would "demean
[the court's] legitimate authority and make an erroneous 'fact' not
having anything to do with ultimate conviction or acquittal the basis
of a final and immutable decision ... "14
11. Chief Justice Dixon and Justice Calogero concurred fully in the plurality opi-
nion on rehearing. Justice Lemmon concurred for assigned reasons. Justice Blanche,
author of the original opinion, and Justices Marcus and Watson dissented from the
reversal of the sentence while concurring with the affirmance of the conviction.
12. 328 So. 2d 65 (La. 1976).
13. 395 So. 2d 757 (La. 1981).
14. Id. at 759.
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McClow highlights a flaw in the supreme court's present ap-
proach. Obviously the appellate court generally is not the proper
tribunal to make new factual determinations of matters not con-
sidered by the trial court. In the future, hopefully the supreme court
will remand the matter to the district court for an adversary factual
determination of the defendant's status, and instruct the trial court
to dismiss the charges if the defendant no longer is alive.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-
THE JUDGE AS THE "THIRTEENTH JUROR"
In Hudson v. Louisiana,"' the United States Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and found
that double jeopardy principles required dismissal of charges
against the defendant. Hudson's first conviction was set aside and a
new, trial was ordered by the trial court based on the trial court's
finding that the evidence was "legally insufficient" to sustain the
conviction. At the new trial the state produced additional evidence
and again convicted the defendant. The Louisiana Supreme Court af-
firmed." Concurring, Justice Tate reasoned that the trial judge
ordered a new trial because he was not personally satisfied with the
state's proof, and not because the evidence was legally insufficient."?
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court did not reject
Justice Tate's analysis of the legal issues; rather, an independent
review of the record led the Supreme Court to conclude that the
trial judge's basis for setting aside the conviction was a finding of
legal insufficiency. 8 If that finding was incorrect, the state's only
remedy was to seek review by an appellate court. The state did not
have the option to retry the case and endeavor to supply the defi-
ciency. This reasoning is, of course, eminently sound, logical, and
fair.
Due to the absence of a clear legislative response in Louisiana to
the problem, trial courts must carefully approach the issue when
presented with an application for a new trial if the allegation is
simply that the "verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence." ''
Under State v. Jones,0 the judge should set aside the conviction if
he is not personally satisfied that the state's case was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt (even though a reasonable juror could
15. 101 S. Ct. 970 (1981).
16. State v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 1294 (La. 1979).
17. Id. at 1298.
18. 101 S. Ct. at 972-73.
19. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851(1).
20. 288 So. 2d 48 (La. 1973).
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have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). As Jones acknowledged,
such a decision to grant (or deny) a new trial on the basis of the
judge's personal feelings about the evidence is not subject to
review. However, if the judge concludes that the state's evidence,
even viewed in a light most favorable to the state, is such that no
reasonable juror could conclude that guilt was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, the trial court must grant a judgment of acquittal
and dismiss the prosecution." The basis for the trial court's decision
ought to be clearly stated for the record. If the trial judge simply
chooses to act as a "thirteenth juror" in granting a new trial, he
should clearly announce his reason. Otherwise the state's opportunity
to retry the case is in jeopardy.
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES STATUTE
Since the legislature adopted Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure article 894.1 requiring the trial court to set forth the factual
basis for the sentence, the supreme court has been deluged with
complaints regarding non-compliance. The court wisely has perceived
two related situations when, despite non-compliance with article
894.1, remand for resentencing is unnecessary. If the sentence is not
apparently severe for the offense, the court does not remand for
compliance. The "apparently severe" test was adopted in State v.
Jones,' a case in which a fifteen year sentence was imposed for a
pistol robbery at a business establishment. Later, in State v. Day,"
the supreme court held that a severe sentence imposed without com-
pliance would be affirmed if the record supported the sentence im-
posed. In Day, a youthful offender broke into an elderly female's
home and beat her into a state of blindness. He sexually assaulted
his victim and left her in a pitiful state, seemingly unconcerned with
whether she lived or died. The case was tried before a jury. In im-
posing a 42'/2 year sentence, the trial judge merely recited the
language of article 894.1's aggravating circumstances. Although the
unilluminating recitation clearly failed to constitute "compliance"
with the statute, the supreme court affirmed. The court said that
because the record supported the sentence, the appellate review
function could be performed without remand.
The supreme court's approach is very logical. Obviously the
guidelines statute is designed both to assist the sentencing court in
the exercise of discretion and to facilitate review of the sentence.
21. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
22. 381 So. 2d 416 (La. 1980).
23. 391 So. 2d 1147 (La. 1980).
19821
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
However, if the appellate court is able to determine that the
sentence is not excessive, no reason for remand exists. On the other
hand, if the record is inadequate due to non-compliance, then the
court must remand for compliance. Otherwise, there can be no effec-
tive basis for reviewing the trial court's sentence.
POST CONVICTION BAIL
In State v. Glass"4 the supreme court very logically employed
the concept of a "case" developed in State v. McCarroll5 to deter-
mine whether the defendant, convicted on multiple counts charged
in a single indictment, was entitled to postconviction bail. In McCar-
roll, Justice Dennis reasoned that the term "case" as used in the Loui-
siana Constitution"6 included a single indictment charging multiple of-
fenses in separate counts. In McCarroll, the court held that the
defendant was entitled to a jury trial if charged in a multiple count
indictment with a series of misdemeanors whose total aggregate
penalty could exceed a $500.00 fine or six months imprisonment.
Glass involved convictions on multiple counts in which the
aggregate penalty did exceed five years. The supreme court, con-
sistent with the McCarroll rationale, held that the defendant was
not entitled to have bail set pending sentencing and appeal. The
court reasoned that the constitution's five year rule" was designed
to recognize the danger of flight by appellants exposed to a severe
penalty. Obviously the same fear of flight extends to situations in
which a total aggregate penalty exposure exceeds five years.
The same result would, of course, follow in postconviction
sentence situations involving multiple count indictments if the total
consecutive sentences imposed exceed five years. However, whether
the supreme court will reach the same result if the multiple convic-
tions (or sentences) do not arise from multiple counts of a single in-
dictment remains to be seen. The concern with the danger of flight
due to exposure to a severe sentence is the same and would seem to
dictate that the trial court should have discretion to deny bail.
24. 389 So. 2d 387 (La. 1980).
25. 337 So. 2d 475 (La. 1976).
26. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17 provides that the defendant has a right to a jury trial
in a "case" in which his maximum penalty exposure exceeds imprisonment for six months.
27. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 18 provides that the defendant has a right to bail prior to
sentence in a "case" in which the maximum penalty exposure does not exceed five
years imprisonment. Otherwise the granting of bail is discretionary with the court.
Similarly, after sentence and pending final disposition of the appeal, the defendant has
a right to bail only if the sentence in the "case" does not exceed five years imprison-
ment. Otherwise, the granting of bail is discretionary.
28. See note 24, supra.
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The writer prefers the federal approach to postconviction bail.
The federal statutes' make postconviction bail discretionary in all
felony cases. The statutes also list certain factors-danger to the
community, the possibility of flight, and frivolity of the appeal-to
be considered in determining whether a defendant should remain
free on bail pending appeal. These factors ought to be the trial
court's basis for deciding whether to grant bail in Louisiana cases in
which postconviction bail is discretionary. Further, in juvenile delin-
quency cases, in which release pending appeal is always discre-
tionary, the trial courts should consider the same factors."
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
In State v. Roy,3' the supreme court developed a modified
Jackson v. Virginiaz test to review the sufficiency of the
defendant's evidence establishing the insanity defense. The court
concluded that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the state no rational fact finder could fail to conclude that "the
defendant established the affirmative defense of insanity by a pre-
ponderance of evidence."33 The supreme court remanded the case
and held that the trial court should have granted the defendant's
motion for a new trial.
The writer feels that the supreme court should have entered a
judgment declaring the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.
Although such an approach would go beyond the Byrd approach" (in
which the appellate court merely strikes the unsupported elements),
it appears logical in view of the nature of the affirmative defense.
The issue of sanity was joined and the jury concluded the matter in
a manner favorable to the state. However, according to the Roy
test, that judgment was not reasonably supported by the evidence.
Such a situation should be treated analogously to the failure of the
state to prove its case. Rather than remand for retrial of the issue
of sanity (or for retrial where the only two verdicts available would
be not guilty by reason of insanity and not guilty) the court should
merely enter the appropriate judgment. The right to trial by jury is
29. See United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146,
3148 (1966); FED. R. App. P. 9.
30. See State in re Banks, 402 So. 2d 690 (La. 1981).
31. 395 So. 2d 664 (La. 1981). See also State v. Claibon, 395 So. 2d 770 (La. 1981);
State v. Price, 403 So. 2d 660 (La. 1981).
32. Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307 (1979).
33. 395 So. 2d at 669.
34. See State v. Gould, 395 So. 2d 647 (La. 1981); State v. Byrd, 385 So. 2d 248
(La. 1980).
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essentially designed to protect the defendant. Therefore, a substitu-
tion of verdicts in a manner more favorable to the defendant does
not deny to the defendant his right to have a jury make the ap-
propriate findings. Similarly, the test (whether a reasonable juror
could have found that the defendant failed to prove his insanity) is
obviously a question of law, not fact, and hence is reviewable. Little
difference may be discerned between: 1) concluding from a review of
the evidence that the defendant preponderantly established his in-
sanity and remanding for a new trial, and 2) so concluding and re-
manding with instructions to enter a judgment of not guilty by
reason of insanity. The latter course seems the fairest and most effi-
cient method.
PLAIN ERROR-
REVIEW OF FUNDAMENTALLY ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Although State v. Williamson35 arose in a unique factual context,
its potential impact on appellate procedure may be profound. The
defendant, a taxi driver, was charged with attempted first degree
murder. The defendant and the victim became involved in a heated
argument. As the victim and his companions drove away, the
defendant pursued and fired a shot at their vehicle, striking the vic-
tim. The jury was instructed erroneously that first degree murder
was the specific intent killing of a human being and that second
degree murder was the unintended killing of another during the
perpetration (or attempted perpetration) of various felonies. In fact,
the first and second degree murder statutes in effect at the time of
the defendant's offense defined first degree murder as a murder
committed under certain enumerated aggravating circumstances and
defined second degree murder to include all other specific intent
killings (and felony murder).
The mistaken instructions are understandable given the
numerous amendments to Louisiana's first and second degree
murder statutes.' Defense counsel did not object to the instructions
given and the evidence did support the jury's verdict of guilty of at-
tempted second degree murder under the proper, applicable defini-
tion of the offense. The issue, thus, was clearly not insufficiency of
evidence. Oddly, had the jury returned a verdict of "guilty as
charged," the evidence would not have supported the conviction
because there was no evidence at all (or even any allegations by the
35. 389 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1980).
36. See 1973 La. Acts, Nos. 109 & 111; 1975 La. Acts, Nos. 327 & 380; 1976 La.
Acts. No. 657; 1977 La. Acts, No. 121; 1978 La. Acts, No. 796; 1979 La. Acts, No. 74.
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state) tending to prove one of the additional aggravating elements of
the newly defined first degree murder.
Therefore, to reverse the conviction the supreme court was re-
quired to recognize a very critical principle: The court may reverse
a conviction if an unobjected-to jury instruction was fundamentally
erroneous in its description of the elements of an offense (even
though the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence). In
reaching this result the court recognized that "it is within the pro-
vince of this reviewing court to entertain complaint of Constitu-
tional violations on appellate review notwithstanding that considera-
tion of such complaint more often than not is deferred until [the] filing
of a writ of habeas corpus.''37
The supreme court wisely reasoned that there was no need for
any further evidentiary determinations and that to delay considera-
tion of the issue would needlessly delay the ultimate resolution of
the issue (and a new prosecution by the state, should the district at-
torney choose to proceed).
In Williamson the court was dealing with a fundamental error in
the "very definition of the crime."38 This error was perceived to be
"of such importance and significance as to violate fundamental re-
quirements of due process." 9 There should be no logical distinction
betweeen a definitional error and other fundamentally erroneous in-
structions which violate due process.
The supreme court seems to be moving toward a plain error
review of fundamentally erroneous jury instructions, a step which
the author applauds. Unquestionably, the contemporaneous objection
rule'" serves an extremely valid purpose in the context of the ad-
missibility of evidentiary items. That is not to say that the rule
serves no purpose in connection with jury instructions. However,
when an instruction (like the one in Williams) is fundamentally
erroneous, it may be more appropriate for the court simply to con-
sider the error on direct appeal rather than to decide the issue in a
postconviction proceeding in the context of defense counsel's alleged
incompetence for failure to raise an objection.
SENTENCING -COMMISSION OF FELONY WITH A FIREARM
Frequently Louisiana offenses are graded depending upon
whether a "dangerous weapon" is employed in the commission of the
37. 389 So. 2d at 1331.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841.
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offense." In the past the legislature defined the crimes themselves
in terms of the mode of execution-i.e., with a dangerous weapon.
The mode of execution became an element of the crime-and thus
an issue to be litigated at the trial on the merits and to be decided
by the jury. 2
However, in the 1981 Regular Session the legislature took a
significant step, along a different path, toward more severely sanc-
tioning felony offenses committed with firearms. The legislature
enacted a new article in the sentencing section of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 3 (newly enacted article 893.1) which mandates a
rather severe formula for imposing terms of imprisonment, without
eligibility for probation or parole, if the judge finds that a firearm
was used in the felony offense for which the accused was convicted.
The accused must be given the maximum sentence if the possible
sentence is less than five years. For offenses with maximum terms
exceeding five years, the new sentencing provision sets a mandatory
five year minimum sentence. The new statute, obviously designed
with the laudatory purpose of deterring felony offenders from using
firearms, creates some interesting problems which must soon be
confronted by the courts.
Although article 893.1 appears to require the mandatory
sentence upon a "finding," upon what evidence should such a "find-
ing" be based? Certainly, in the case of a trial, the evidence
presented should be an obvious source. However, in the case of a
guilty plea, no such record will exist. Under those circumstances,
the writer assumes that the trial courts will require an adversary
determination of the question based on evidence properly introduced.
Although all of the rules of evidence are not applicable to sentenc-
ing determinations, fairness would seem to require an adversary
determination of this critical factor, with the burden of proof falling
on the state.
Certainly the defendant should be entitled to notice that the
41. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 14:34, 37, 60 & 64 (1950).
42. See cases cited in note 34, supra.
43. 1981 La. Acts, No. 139. The new article 893.1 provides:
When the court makes a finding that a firearm was used in the commission of a
felony and when suspension of sentence is not otherwise prohibited, the court
shall impose a sentence which is not less than:
(a) The maximum sentence provided by law in the same manner as provided
in the offense, if the maximum sentence is less than five years or
(b) Five years, in the same manner as provided in the offense, if the maximum
sentence is five years or more.
Imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended and the offender
shall not be eligible for probation or parole.
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state (or trial court) intends to invoke the mandatory penalty. In
some cases the indictment (and responses to bills of particulars) will
allege that a firearm was the "dangerous weapon" used in the com-
mission of an offense. However, the sentencing statute is not limited
to crimes requiring the use of a dangerous weapon (and particularly
not a "firearm"). Thus, for example, crimes such as aggravated bat-
tery, attempted murder, and aggravated criminal damage to property
which may be committed using a firearm will require a post verdict
finding by the trial court to decide whether the mandatory penalty
provisions are applicable. In such a case, the defendant obviously
needs to know exactly what he is admitting if he pleads guilty since
the plea of guilty may be the basis of a "finding" for an article 893.1
mandatory sentence. Therefore, a special notice of intent to seek
such a finding should be required, and should form the basis for a
sentencing hearing.
The courts must also determine the nature of the proceeding at
which such a "finding" will be made. The writer feels that the state
should be required to provoke an adversary hearing at which such a
finding would be made (similar to the habitual offender procedures).
The defendant should be entitled to seek appellate review and
reversal of an adverse judgment if the evidence does not support
the finding. On the other hand, if the evidence does compel the find-
ing then the state apparently is entitled to demand that the man-
datory sentence be imposed. The legislature apparently did not in-
tend to vest discretion in the trial court to impose the mandatory
sentence if the evidence would convince any reasonable fact finder
that a firearm was used in the commission of the felony. Thus, ap-
pellate review of the refusal to make a finding obviously is
necessary in order to assure compliance with the legislative man-
date.
The courts also will have to decide whether the mandatory
sentencing rules apply when a firearm is used in the commission of
the felony offense by a participant other than the defendant himself.
The courts will also face problems in defining the scope of terms
like "firearm," "used," and "commission." Presumably a firearm in-
cludes an unloaded weapon capable of firing-and whether an un-
workable pistol falls within the scope of the statute must be decided.
Further, the concept of "commission" may include only activity more
closely related to the offense than the "perpetration zone," a con-
cept used in the "felony murder" and "felony manslaughter"
statutes. Even the concept of "use" will require development. A per-
son who committed a kidnapping with a loaded pistol in his coat
pocket (which he never displayed to the victim) was "armed" with
the firearm. Whether he "used" the firearm is a separate question.
19821
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The writer's purpose in illustrating some of the incipient litiga-
tion problems is not to be critical of the concept of developing man-
datory sentencing procedures with clearly articulated elements. The
statute's purpose is laudable and the legislature, in the writer's opi-
nion, was wise to employ generic terms. The approach wisely
relegates the development of some of these conceptual problems to
the adversary process of case-by-case litigation.
